Friedrich A. Hayeks Individualism and Economic Order Summary Essay

Friedrich A. Hayeks Individualism and Economic Order Summary - Essay Example The themes used by the writer indeed became the central ideas around which the entire book, which is actually made up of a collection of writings was written. Four of these basic ideas are summarized below. Facts and Fallacies of Individualism The economist holds a basic idea that individualism, and for that matter social order is neither a fact nor a fallacy but that it is both a true and false. First, the economist writes to associate individualism more to be a social order whereby regardless of the fact that people are expected to behave and react in a certain individualistic manner to meet their economic needs of life, they are at the same time obliged to act according to the larger interest of society. From this perspective, the economist goes on further to give vivid reasons why individualism and for that matter, the social order could be considered to be false. The explanation given is that â€Å"in social matters, one does not adhere to fixed principles but decides each ques tion "on its merits"; that one is generally guided by expediency† (Hayek, 1996, p. 1). Invariably, the writer is implying that no individual would be robotic to economic principles even when those principles deny him food on his table. This is what makes individualism true because people function economically according to the dictates of their conditions. On the other hand, there is a justification given as to why individualism and economic order could be true. With this, the economist explains that â€Å"principles, have a way of asserting themselves even if they are not explicitly recognized but are only implied in particular decisions (Hayek, 1996, p. 1).† In other words, even if a person defies the provisions of economic principles, the core values of these principles remain a fact and thus true. The use of Knowledge in Society In the second theme and basic knowledge explicitly outlined by the economist, he visits the availability of knowledge and the use of it ther eof in modern society. Whiles doing this, the economist related economies to social science by making the assertion that the provisions that make social existence possible form the basis of rational economic order (Gabby, 2005). To this, the economist emphasizes the point that what society really needs to manage its rational economic order is logic. By logic, the economist talks of using common sense presented at the individual stage of getting things worked out for a person. A clear sense, therefore, an endorsement is made by the writer of individualism as a fact by raising the point of logic. The economist further throws light on the fact that the logic needed to make things work out for individual entities within society comes about as a result of making use of available information, and thus knowledge.

Grate Expectations Essay Example for Free

Grate Expectations Essay Dickens creates an atmosphere setting in order to engage the interest of the reader at the beginning of the novel. Dickens used to serialise his novels. The story opens in an impressive way when he introduces us to pip in the graveyard because most of his familys bodies are burred there. This makes the reader feel scared, frightened and we start to emphasise with pip at the beginning of the novel because we now feel sorry for him because his parents are dead. Owing to this parents death he lives with his older sister Ms Joe Gargery and his brother in law Joe Gargery the blacksmith, pip sister is really mean to pip and his brother in law treats pip like his younger son. In the 19th century, infant mortality rates were higher. The infant mortality rate is the number of children per year out of every thousand alive that die before they reach the age of one or more specifically, under the age of five. This made us aware at the beginning of chapter 1 when Pip described the graves of his brothers. This might surprise the modern reader but Dickens did not comment on it because such death of very young children in his day was very common. The tension is increased in the novel as there is an escaped convict who will soon meet Pip, which is emphasised by the emotions on Pips face, held tighter to the tombstone on which he had put me; party, to keep myself upon it; partly, to keep my self from crying this shows Pips emotion. When we continued to read, we will get to know that Pip went to the graveyard because of his parents and five brothers. Also before the conversation between the convict and Pip, Dickens continued to describe the scenery negatively, talking of the low leaden line to describe the river. This brings feelings heaviness and being trapped. The wind was rushing finishes a third paragraph, with yet another idea of bleak weather, making Pip hear things and scaring him. This makes the reader more frightened for Pip and also the way he described the weather makes the reader know that it wasnt close to the end of the day and also danger was lurking about. Pip continues to describe the two black things that seemed to be standing upright and he talks about a gibbet where they hang people. The above-mentioned talk of graveyards plus the gibbet makes the audience know everything seem very sad and also both are associated with death. The audience gets further engaged because again we start to feel sympathy for the boy who seems so helpless and needy. On the other hand, the novel Great Expectations is actually being told by Pip himself, both as a child, and as an adult looking back at when he was younger. This is very effective and successful language by Dickens, as it gives us an adult opinion and perspective of a childs life. At this point, the audience will know that the narrator dickens is a mature on, because he talks about his childish conclusions of his family by looking at the inscription on their gravestones and how his young tongue could only make out the name Pip from his full name. From the inscription, I drew a childish conclusion that my mother was dotted and ill. Also in the story, Pip described himself in third person like he was looking back on a distant memory. The readers too start to reminisce about their past and if they are older they can identify with the language used by the older Pip. How Charles Dickens describes the bundle of shivers made Pip seem very small, vulnerable and easily exposed to attack. The convict made a very dramatic entrance into the story. This is because we hear the man before we see him. Also his entrance was much as a shock to the reader as to Pip. This creates tension because it shows that the convict has discovered that Pip is hiding in the graveyard very near him. The man started talking to Pip with an angry voice by saying, keep still you little devil or I will cut your throat, dialect of Magwitch. The way and manner the man talked to Pip frightened him. The conversation between Pip and the convict was very short and choppy. The man introduces a lot of commands into his conversation. One typical example of his command in their conversation was when he said, Keep quiet. This shows the audience that something was going to happen to Pip. Also, the reader now begins to form ideas about the convict. We now see him as heartless, a no good person and extremely evil to speak to a child in the manner. In the novel, the convict turned Pip upside down and gnawed bread from his pocket like a lion on its prey. When the convict turned Pip upside down, the young Pip saw the world in a new way. Here Dickens uses humour to engage the reader. The situation is humours because of the revelation of how children can respond differently to adults in a negative situation. Also, when the convict wanted to eat Pips cheeks, the older Pip looked back and admits impartially that; he did have fat cheeks as a child. This also shows the audience Pip was a humorous person who uses things he can identify with to make comparison. This also tells us that the convict was extremely fat and huge or just hungry. Dickens gives the audience a very detailed and precise description of what the man looks like, he looks scruffy to pip but dickens doesnt describe him as scruffy, he was having dishevelled broken shoes, he was with no hat, he was having a rag tied around his head, he was soaked in water, covered in mud and he was with a manacle on one leg. A manacle is an old English word for handcuff or a long big metal chain. The manacle on one of his legs will also let the audience know that he was a prisoner. Also the fact that he was with no hat shows the audience that he has no respect according to the 19th century manners.

Comparative Political Systems France Germany Politics Essay

Comparative Political Systems France Germany Politics Essay France is a democratic republic with a parliamentary founded on the principle of the division of powers: executive, legislative and judiciary. The Federal Republic of Germany has a democratic constitution and its constitution was elaborated in 1949 with the great West powers help such as the United States, Great Britain and France. Their parliamentary and democratic constitution is based on the Constitution of the United States and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. But Germany is a federal country and differs with France by its original organization. Firstly, what is a federal state? In fact, it is like an association of different states where the central power coordinates several departments. However, each state itself has significant autonomy. Each federated state has its own government, its own deputy chambers. After the First World War, the Weimar Republic also had a federal system. The only period without federalism was under the third Reich with Hitler in 1949. The notion of native country is very strong in every German speaking country. Indeed, the native country is more important than the nation. In addition of being a federal country, German political system is very structured. The executive power is in the hands of the President, the chancellor and the Là ¤nder. The president is not elected by the universal suffrage and in fact, has just a representative role. The president is elected for a term of five years, not more than two terms by a federal assembly which is constituted by deputies of the Bundestag, the federal dieting and by the Landtage delegates. Moreover, during the French-German summits, we can see two public figures on stage; on the one hand is the German chancellor and on the other hand is the French president. Thus in France, unlike in Germany, the President is the most important figure. The French presidential election proceeds like the legislative elections. There is then a second round if none of the candidates obtains the majority in the first round. The candidature to the presidential election obliged the candidates to obtain 500 signatures of elected people, whether they are Deputies or local Counselor. The French President appoints the Prime minister who appoints the government. The President leads the ministers council. The President approves or refuses to promulgate new laws or to appoint the public officials. He is the head of the national protection and has the highest power to decide to use the French nuclear or not. He is also the head of the foreign affairs, one of his most important representative roles. He can dissolve the National Assembly after consulting the Prime Minister who is the head of the National Assembly and the Senate. The German chancellor, or prime minister, is in charge of the Federal Government, is appointed by the Parliament and finally forms the Government. The Là ¤nders are elected by the universal suffrage, have their own parliament and their local government. The French Prime Minister, appointed by the President, can recruit the ministers he wants and suggests them to the president. The prime minister exerts a strong power on the Assembly and leads the French government. The German legislative power is the federal parliament which is constituted by two chambers: the Bundestag or the deputy chamber which is elected by the universal suffrage for four years and the Bundesrat which represents each Là ¤nder. The members of the Bundesrat are appointed by their local government. The Bundestag votes the laws, elects the federal chancellor and controls the government. Half of their deputies are directly elected by a simple majority, the other half are locally elected and have to have at least 5 five per cent in the party they are in to be represented. The Bundestag has 656 seats. The Bundesrat represents the sixteen federal Là ¤nder and is composed of sixty nine delegates appointed by the local government. Each Là ¤nder is represented by three to six delegates who can only express their opinion in a whole. When the Bundestag and the Bundesrat disagree, an arbitration committee is formed with members of these two chambers. The French fifth Republic is a democratic and parliamentary regime. It is bicameral with the presence of the National Assembly and the Senate. Both of them form the Congress. The Senate represents regions and villages and is composed of 422 members called senators. Their term of office is very long because it lasts nine years. One third of the senators are reelected every three years. They are indirectly elected by the senator delegates. The senate discusses the laws which have been voted by the National Assembly and approves or refuses them. The senate tends to be conservative and this can explain the left parties toughness with their members than with the right parties. Unlike Germany, France is a totally centralized country where the central power is in Paris. Doubtlessly, the different regions exist but hardly have autonomy because decisions are taken in Paris. This can be explained by the wishes of all the kings of France since Hugues Capet in 987, later followed by Louis XIV who all wanted to attract aristocratic people in order to watch them closely. The French revolution and then the emperor Napoleon had just strengthened the French centralization. Despite many clashes in France, French people are more patriotic than German people. French people feel that they are the heirs of a long cultural and state tradition. They feel that they belong to an entity, the nation which is for them something stable, immutable, or even endless. The French communist PCF (parti communiste franà §ais) party was the second most powerful party in the West after the Italian communist party. During these last three decades, the French communist party has always had the dissenting role. Despite their high affinity with the working class, they are left out of the national government. Their role is almost only local where there is a high amount of working people. The extremist FN (Front National) party like the National Front has always been led by one man named Jean-Marie Le Pen who is the heir of a tradition which is the extreme right. Their supporters and the extreme left have in common the basic dissatisfaction of their present governing political party. Like the leftist, the extreme right hates the ruling and political class which are for them part of the general conspiracy against people. This party dream of a fundamental change of the society. Unlike the extreme right party which is anti-individualistic and anti-Semitic, the extreme left is individualistic and anarchistic. Their ideal is a hierarchical society, strictly ordered and disciplined. This party is hardly happy because they think that their country is gnawed by virus which is composed of Jewish people, crooked politicians, selfish intellectuals, homosexuals, immigrant workers, and sick people from the HIVà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦ Jean-Marie Le Pen supports the idea of xenophobia which is widespread in France because some French people are overwhelmed by a swarthy immigrants and colored peoples wave. The feeling of their powerlessness caused by this immigration is growing more and more because all these hated people have the French nationality. Jean-Marie Le Pen and his supporters want to modify the French nationality regulation, making it restrictive. The oldest and one of the greatest parties in Germany is the SPD which is a social democrat party. This party was founded before the Second World War. The CDU party was founded in 1945 after the Second World War for the socialist reorganization of the society. This party thinks that the Marxist socialism is the best way to come to the Christian ideals. This party is like the PSU party, they are both communist. The FDP is a liberal politic German party founded in 1948. This party defends the basic freedom and free trades. This party is nowadays the third party of the Bundestag by their seats number which has 96 deputy seats. It is also present in five out of sixteen Là ¤nder. It is the party of the executive people, the high and middle class. The FDP has governed for 42 years in total and is now still governing after ten years of opposition. To conclude, these two countries have slightly different political systems but they are both one of the worlds power. The Federal Republic of Germany is the most populated country in the European Union with about 80 million inhabitants since the reunification of Germany in 1990. Moreover it is the third economic power after the United States and Japan. Thus, it is an important part of the European Union like France with their economic power. France is historically one of the firmest supporters of European Integration and this has benefited French industrialization significantly.

Dealing with Loss in Killing the Bear Essay -- Minty Killing the Bear

Dealing with Loss in Killing the Bear Often things that we experience as children have lasting affects on us that creep up when we least expect them. In Judith Minty's story "Killing the Bear", a woman finds herself in just such a situation. She finally deals with something that happened to her as a young child that she probably never even realized was bothering her. In this story the central character painfully comes to grips with a major loss of security from her childhood. Throughout "Killing the Bear" the author flips back and forth from the story at hand and seemingly only loosely related anecdotes about the main character and bears. One of the first of these side stories is about the woman's childhood. It talks about something that happens to most children, the loss of an object of security. The girl is attached to a stuffed bear and her mother takes it away "for three months" (12). She is told that when the time is over if she has stopped sucking her thumb, she can have the toy back. When the time passes, however, the child discovers...

Beyond Good and Evil Essay

UPPOSING that Truth is a woman—what then? Is there not ground for suspecting that all philosophers, in so far as they have been dogmatists, have failed to understand women—that the terrible seriousness and clumsy importunity with which they have usually paid their addresses to Truth, have been unskilled and unseemly methods for winning a woman? Certainly she has never allowed herself to be won; and at present every kind of dogma stands with sad and discouraged mien—IF, indeed, it stands at all! For there are scoffers who maintain that it has fallen, that all dogma lies on the ground—nay more, that it is at its last gasp. But to speak seriously, there are good grounds for hoping that all dogmatizing in philosophy, whatever solemn, whatever conclusive and decided airs it has assumed, may have been only a noble puerilism and tyronism; and probably the time is at hand when it will be once and again understood WHAT has actually sufficed for the basis of such imposing and absolute philosophical edifices as the dogmatists have hitherto reared: perhaps some popular superstition of immemorial time (such as the soul-superstition, which, in the form of subject- and ego-superstition, has not yet ceased doing mischief): perhaps some play upon words, a deception on the part of grammar, or an audacious generalization of very restricted, very personal, very human—all-too-human facts. Beyond Good and Evil S The philosophy of the dogmatists, it is to be hoped, was only a promise for thousands of years afterwards, as was astrology in still earlier times, in the service of which probably more labour, gold, acuteness, and patience have been spent than on any actual science hitherto: we owe to it, and to its ‘super- terrestrial’ pretensions in Asia and Egypt, the grand style of architecture. It seems that in order to inscribe themselves upon the heart of humanity with everlasting claims, all great things have first to wander about the earth as enormous and awe- inspiring caricatures: dogmatic philosophy has been a caricature of this kind—for instance, the Vedanta doctrine in Asia, and Platonism in Europe. Let us not be ungrateful to it, although it must certainly be confessed that the worst, the most tiresome, and the most dangerous of errors hitherto has been a dogmatist error—namely, Plato’s invention of Pure Spirit and the Good in Itself. But now when it has been surmounted, when Europe, rid of this nightmare, can again draw breath freely and at least enjoy a healthier—sleep, we, WHOSE DUTY IS WAKEFULNESS ITSELF, are the heirs of all the strength which the struggle against this error has fostered. It amounted to the very inversion of truth, and the denial of the PERSPECTIVE— the fundamental condition—of life, to speak of Spirit and the Good as Plato spoke of them; indeed one might ask, as a physician: ‘How did such a malady attack that finest product of antiquity, Plato? Had the wicked Socrates really corrupted him? Was Socrates after all a corrupter of youths, and deserved his hemlock? ’ But the struggle against Plato, or—to speak plainer, and for the ‘people’—the strugFree eBooks at Planet eBook. comgle against the ecclesiastical oppression of millenniums of Christianity (FOR CHRISITIANITY IS PLATONISM FOR THE ‘PEOPLE’), produced in Europe a magnificent tension of soul, such as had not existed anywhere previously; with such a tensely strained bow one can now aim at the furthest goals. As a matter of fact, the European feels this tension as a state of distress, and twice attempts have been made in grand style to unbend the bow: once by means of Jesuitism, and the second time by means of democratic enlightenment—which, with the aid of liberty of the press and newspaper-reading, might, in fact, bring it about that the spirit would not so easily find itself in ‘distress’! (The Germans invented gunpowder-all credit to them! but they again made things square—they invented printing. ) But we, who are neither Jesuits, nor democrats, nor even sufficiently Germans, we GOOD EUROPEANS, and free, VERY free spirits—we have it still, all the distress of spirit and all the tension of its bow! And perhaps also the arrow, the duty, and, who knows? THE GOAL TO AIM AT†¦. Sils Maria Upper Engadine, JUNE, 1885.Beyond Good and Evil CHAPTER I: PREJUDICES OF PHILOSOPHERS 1. The Will to Truth, which is to tempt us to many a hazardous enterprise, the famous Truthfulness of which all philosophers have hitherto spoken with respect, what questions has this Will to Truth not laid before us! What strange, perplexing, questionable questions! It is already a long story; yet it seems as if it were hardly commenced. Is it any wonder if we at last grow distrustful, lose patience, and turn impatiently away? That this Sphinx teaches us at last to ask questions ourselves? WHO is it really that puts questions to us here? WHAT really is this ‘Will to Truth’ in us? In fact we made a long halt at the question as to the origin of this Will—until at last we came to an absolute standstill before a yet more fundamental question. We inquired about the VALUE of this Will. Granted that we want the truth: WHY NOT RATHER untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? The problem of the value of truth presented itself before us—or was it we who presented ourselves before the problem? Which of us is the Oedipus here? Which the Sphinx? It would seem to be a rendezvous of questions and notes of interrogation. And could it be believed that it at last seems to us as if the problem had never been propounded before, as if we were the first to discern it, get a sight of it, Free eBooks at Planet eBook. com .and RISK RAISING it? For there is risk in raising it, perhaps there is no greater risk. 2. ‘HOW COULD anything originate out of its opposite? For example, truth out of error? or the Will to Truth out of the will to deception? or the generous deed out of selfishness? or the pure sun-bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness? Such genesis is impossible; whoever dreams of it is a fool, nay, worse than a fool; things of the highest value must have a different origin, an origin of THEIR own—in this transitory, seductive, illusory, paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, they cannot have their source. But rather in the lap of Being, in the intransitory, in the concealed God, in the ‘Thing-in-itself— THERE must be their source, and nowhere else! ’ —This mode of reasoning discloses the typical prejudice by which metaphysicians of all times can be recognized, this mode of valuation is at the back of all their logical procedure; through this ‘belief’ of theirs, they exert themselves for their ‘knowledge,’ for something that is in the end solemnly christened ‘the Truth. ’ The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is THE BELIEF IN ANTITHESES OF VALUES. It never occurred even to the wariest of them to doubt here on the very threshold (where doubt, however, was most necessary); though they had made a solemn vow, ‘DE OMNIBUS DUBITANDUM. ’ For it may be doubted, firstly, whether antitheses exist at all; and secondly, whether the popular valuations and antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provi Beyond Good and Evil sional perspectives, besides being probably made from some corner, perhaps from below—‘frog perspectives,’ as it were, to borrow an expression current among painters. In spite of all the value which may belong to the true, the positive, and the unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life generally should be assigned to pretence, to the will to delusion, to selfishness, and cupidity. It might even be possible that WHAT constitutes the value of those good and respected things, consists precisely in their being insidiously related, knotted, and crocheted to these evil and apparently opposed things—perhaps even in being essentially identical with them. Perhaps! But who wishes to concern himself with such dangerous ‘Perhapses’! For that investigation one must await the advent of a new order of philosophers, such as will have other tastes and inclinations, the reverse of those hitherto prevalent—philosophers of the dangerous ‘Perhaps’ in every sense of the term. And to speak in all seriousness, I see such new philosophers beginning to appear. 3. Having kept a sharp eye on philosophers, and having read between their lines long enough, I now say to myself that the greater part of conscious thinking must be counted among the instinctive functions, and it is so even in the case of philosophical thinking; one has here to learn anew, as one learned anew about heredity and ‘innateness. ’ As little as the act of birth comes into consideration in the whole process and procedure of heredity, just as little is ‘being-conscious’ OPPOSED to the instinctive in any decisive Free eBooks at Planet eBook. comsense; the greater part of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly influenced by his instincts, and forced into definite channels. And behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, there are valuations, or to speak more plainly, physiological demands, for the maintenance of a definite mode of life For example, that the certain is worth more than the uncertain, that illusion is less valuable than ‘truth’ such valuations, in spite of their regulative importance for US, might notwithstanding be only superficial valuations, special kinds of maiserie, such as may be necessary for the maintenance of beings such as ourselves. Supposing, in effect, that man is not just the ‘measure of things. ’ 4. The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it: it is here, perhaps, that our new language sounds most strangely. The question is, how far an opinion is lifefurthering, life- preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing, and we are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to which the synthetic judgments a priori belong), are the most indispensable to us, that without a recognition of logical fictions, without a comparison of reality with the purely IMAGINED world of the absolute and immutable, without a constant counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers, man could not live—that the renunciation of false opinions would be a renunciation of life, a negation of life. TO RECOGNISE UNTRUTH AS A CONDITION OF LIFE; that is certainly to impugn the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a phi Beyond Good and Evil losophy which ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed itself beyond good and evil. 5. That which causes philosophers to be regarded halfdistrustfully and half-mockingly, is not the oft-repeated discovery how innocent they are—how often and easily they make mistakes and lose their way, in short, how childish and childlike they are,—but that there is not enough honest dealing with them, whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry when the problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who, fairer and foolisher, talk of ‘inspiration’), whereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, idea, or ‘suggestion,’ which is generally their heart’s desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event. They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders, also, of their prejudices, which they dub ‘truths,’— and VERY far from having the conscience which bravely admits this to itself, very far from having the good taste of the courage which goes so far as to let this be understood, perhaps to warn friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule. The spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and decent, with which he entices us into the dialectic by-ways that lead (more correctly mislead) to his ‘categorical imperative’— makes us fastidious ones smile, we who find no small amusement in spying out Free eBooks at Planet eBook. comthe subtle tricks of old moralists and ethical preachers. Or, still more so, the hocus-pocus in mathematical form, by means of which Spinoza has, as it were, clad his philosophy in mail and mask—in fact, the ‘love of HIS wisdom,’ to translate the term fairly and squarely—in order thereby to strike terror at once into the heart of the assailant who should dare to cast a glance on that invincible maiden, that Pallas Athene:—how much of personal timidity and vulnerability does this masquerade of a sickly recluse betray! 6. It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of—namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious auto-biography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of which the entire plant has always grown. Indeed, to understand how the abstrusest metaphysical assertions of a philosopher have been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to first ask oneself: ‘What morality do they (or does he) aim at? ’ Accordingly, I do not believe that an ‘impulse to knowledge’ is the father of philosophy; but that another impulse, here as elsewhere, has only made use of knowledge (and mistaken knowledge! ) as an instrument. But whoever considers the fundamental impulses of man with a view to determining how far they may have here acted as INSPIRING GENII (or as demons and cobolds), will find that they have all practiced philosophy at one time or another, and that each one of them would have been only too glad to look upon itself as the ultimate end of existence 10 Beyond Good and Evil and the legitimate LORD over all the other impulses. For every impulse is imperious, and as SUCH, attempts to philosophize. To be sure, in the case of scholars, in the case of really scientific men, it may be otherwise—‘better,’ if you will; there there may really be such a thing as an ‘impulse to knowledge,’ some kind of small, independent clock-work, which, when well wound up, works away industriously to that end, WITHOUT the rest of the scholarly impulses taking any material part therein. The actual ‘interests’ of the scholar, therefore, are generally in quite another direction— in the family, perhaps, or in money-making, or in politics; it is, in fact, almost indifferent at what point of research his little machine is placed, and whether the hopeful young worker becomes a good philologist, a mushroom specialist, or a chemist; he is not CHARACTERISED by becoming this or that. In the philosopher, on the contrary, there is absolutely nothing impersonal; and above all, his morality furnishes a decided and decisive testimony as to WHO HE IS,—that is to say, in what order the deepest impulses of his nature stand to each other. 7. How malicious philosophers can be! I know of nothing more stinging than the joke Epicurus took the liberty of making on Plato and the Platonists; he called them Dionysiokolakes. In its original sense, and on the face of it, the word signifies ‘Flatterers of Dionysius’—consequently, tyrants’ accessories and lick-spittles; besides this, however, it is as much as to say, ‘They are all ACTORS, there is nothing genuine about them’ (for Dionysiokolax was a popular Free eBooks at Planet eBook. com 11 name for an actor). And the latter is really the malignant reproach that Epicurus cast upon Plato: he was annoyed by the grandiose manner, the mise en scene style of which Plato and his scholars were masters—of which Epicurus was not a master! He, the old school-teacher of Samos, who sat concealed in his little garden at Athens, and wrote three hundred books, perhaps out of rage and ambitious envy of Plato, who knows! Greece took a hundred years to find out who the garden-god Epicurus really was. Did she ever find out? 8. There is a point in every philosophy at which the ‘conviction’ of the philosopher appears on the scene; or, to put it in the words of an ancient mystery: Adventavit asinus, Pulcher et fortissimus. 9. You desire to LIVE ‘according to Nature’? Oh, you noble Stoics, what fraud of words! Imagine to yourselves a being like Nature, boundlessly extravagant, boundlessly indifferent, without purpose or consideration, without pity or justice, at once fruitful and barren and uncertain: imagine to yourselves INDIFFERENCE as a power—how COULD you live in accordance with such indifference? To live—is not that just endeavouring to be otherwise than this Nature? Is not living valuing, preferring, being unjust, being limited, endeavouring to be different? And granted that your imperative, ‘living according to Nature,’ means actu1 Beyond Good and Evil ally the same as ‘living according to life’—how could you do DIFFERENTLY? Why should you make a principle out of what you yourselves are, and must be? In reality, however, it is quite otherwise with you: while you pretend to read with rapture the canon of your law in Nature, you want something quite the contrary, you extraordinary stage-players and self-deluders! In your pride you wish to dictate your morals and ideals to Nature, to Nature herself, and to incorporate them therein; you insist that it shall be Nature ‘according to the Stoa,’ and would like everything to be made after your own image, as a vast, eternal glorification and generalism of Stoicism! With all your love for truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, and with such hypnotic rigidity to see Nature FALSELY, that is to say, Stoically, that you are no longer able to see it otherwise— and to crown all, some unfathomable superciliousness gives you the Bedlamite hope that BECAUSE you are able to tyrannize over yourselves—Stoicism is self-tyranny—Nature will also allow herself to be tyrannized over: is not the Stoic a PART of Nature? †¦ But this is an old and everlasting story: what happened in old times with the Stoics still happens today, as soon as ever a philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical impulse itself, the most spiritual Will to Power, the will to ‘creation of the world,’ the will to the causa prima. 10. The eagerness and subtlety, I should even say craftiness, with which the problem of ‘the real and the apparent world’ Free eBooks at Planet eBook. com 1 is dealt with at present throughout Europe, furnishes food for thought and attention; and he who hears only a ‘Will to Truth’ in the background, and nothing else, cannot certainly boast of the sharpest ears. In rare and isolated cases, it may really have happened that such a Will to Truth—a certain extravagant and adventurous pluck, a metaphysician’s ambition of the forlorn hope—has participated therein: that which in the end always prefers a handful of ‘certainty’ to a whole cartload of beautiful possibilities; there may even be puritanical fanatics of conscience, who prefer to put their last trust in a sure nothing, rather than in an uncertain something. But that is Nihilism, and the sign of a despairing, mortally wearied soul, notwithstanding the courageous bearing such a virtue may display. It seems, however, to be otherwise with stronger and livelier thinkers who are still eager for life. In that they side AGAINST appearance, and speak superciliously of ‘perspective,’ in that they rank the credibility of their own bodies about as low as the credibility of the ocular evidence that ‘the earth stands still,’ and thus, apparently, allowing with complacency their securest possession to escape (for what does one at present believe in more firmly than in one’s body? ),—who knows if they are not really trying to win back something which was formerly an even securer possession, something of the old domain of the faith of former times, perhaps the ‘immortal soul,’ perhaps ‘the old God,’ in short, ideas by which they could live better, that is to say, more vigorously and more joyously, than by ‘modern ideas’? There is DISTRUST of these modern ideas in this mode of looking at things, a 1 Beyond Good and Evil disbelief in all that has been constructed yesterday and today; there is perhaps some slight admixture of satiety and scorn, which can no longer endure the BRIC-A-BRAC of ideas of the most varied origin, such as so-called Positivism at present throws on the market; a disgust of the more refined taste at the village-fair motleyness and patchiness of all these reality-philosophasters, in whom there is nothing either new or true, except this motleyness. Therein it seems to me that we should agree with those skeptical anti-realists and knowledge-microscopists of the present day; their instinct, which repels them from MODERN reality, is unrefuted †¦ what do their retrograde by-paths concern us! The main thing about them is NOT that they wish to go ‘back,’ but that they wish to get AWAY therefrom. A little MORE strength, swing, courage, and artistic power, and they would be OFF—and not back! 11. It seems to me that there is everywhere an attempt at present to divert attention from the actual influence which Kant exercised on German philosophy, and especially to ignore prudently the value which he set upon himself. Kant was first and foremost proud of his Table of Categories; with it in his hand he said: ‘This is the most difficult thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics. ’ Let us only understand this ‘could be’! He was proud of having DISCOVERED a new faculty in man, the faculty of synthetic judgment a priori. Granting that he deceived himself in this matter; the development and rapid flourishing of German philosophy depended nevertheless on his pride, and on the Free eBooks at Planet eBook. com 1 eager rivalry of the younger generation to discover if possible something—at all events ‘new faculties’—of which to be still prouder! —But let us reflect for a moment—it is high time to do so. ‘How are synthetic judgments a priori POSSIBLE? ’ Kant asks himself—and what is really his answer? ‘BY MEANS OF A MEANS (faculty)’—but unfortunately not in five words, but so circumstantially, imposingly, and with such display of German profundity and verbal flourishes, that one altogether loses sight of the comical niaiserie allemande involved in such an answer. People were beside themselves with delight over this new faculty, and the jubilation reached its climax when Kant further discovered a moral faculty in man—for at that time Germans were still moral, not yet dabbling in the ‘Politics of hard fact. ’ Then came the honeymoon of German philosophy. All the young theologians of the Tubingen institution went immediately into the groves—all seeking for ‘faculties. ’ And what did they not find—in that innocent, rich, and still youthful period of the German spirit, to which Romanticism, the malicious fairy, piped and sang, when one could not yet distinguish between ‘finding’ and ‘inventing’! Above all a faculty for the ‘transcendental†; Schelling christened it, intellectual intuition, and thereby gratified the most earnest longings of the naturally pious-inclined Germans. One can do no greater wrong to the whole of this exuberant and eccentric movement (which was really youthfulness, notwithstanding that it disguised itself so boldly, in hoary and senile conceptions), than to take it seriously, or even treat it with moral indignation. Enough, however—the world 1 Beyond Good and Evil grew older, and the dream vanished. A time came when people rubbed their foreheads, and they still rub them today. People had been dreaming, and first and foremost—old Kant. ‘By means of a means (faculty)’—he had said, or at least meant to say. But, is that—an answer? An explanation? Or is it not rather merely a repetition of the question? How does opium induce sleep? ‘By means of a means (faculty), ‘namely the virtus dormitiva, replies the doctor in Moliere, Quia est in eo virtus dormitiva, Cujus est natura sensus assoupire. But such replies belong to the realm of comedy, and it is high time to replace the Kantian question, ‘How are synthetic judgments a PRIORI possible? ’ by another question, ‘Why is belief in such judgments necessary? ’—in effect, it is high time that we should understand that such judgments must be believed to be true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like ourselves; though they still might naturally be false judgments! Or, more plainly spoken, and roughly and readily—synthetic judgments a priori should not ‘be possible’ at all; we have no right to them; in our mouths they are nothing but false judgments. Only, of course, the belief in their truth is necessary, as plausible belief and ocular evidence belonging to the perspective view of life. And finally, to call to mind the enormous influence which ‘German philosophy’—I hope you understand its right to inverted commas (goosefeet)? —has Free eBooks at Planet eBook. com 1 exercised throughout the whole of Europe, there is no doubt that a certain VIRTUS DORMITIVA had a share in it; thanks to German philosophy, it was a delight to the noble idlers, the virtuous, the mystics, the artiste, the three-fourths Christians, and the political obscurantists of all nations, to find an antidote to the still overwhelming sensualism which overflowed from the last century into this, in short—‘sensus assoupire. ’ †¦ 12. As regards materialistic atomism, it is one of the best- refuted theories that have been advanced, and in Europe there is now perhaps no one in the learned world so unscholarly as to attach serious signification to it, except for convenient everyday use (as an abbreviation of the means of expression)— thanks chiefly to the Pole Boscovich: he and the Pole Copernicus have hitherto been the greatest and most successful opponents of ocular evidence. For while Copernicus has persuaded us to believe, contrary to all the senses, that the earth does NOT stand fast, Boscovich has taught us to abjure the belief in the last thing that ‘stood fast’ of the earth—the belief in ‘substance,’ in ‘matter,’ in the earth-residuum, and particle- atom: it is the greatest triumph over the senses that has hitherto been gained on earth. One must, however, go still further, and also declare war, relentless war to the knife, against the ‘atomistic requirements’ which still lead a dangerous after-life in places where no one suspects them, like the more celebrated ‘metaphysical requirements†: one must also above all give the finishing stroke to that other and more portentous atomism which Christianity has 1 Beyond Good and Evil taught best and longest, the SOUL- ATOMISM. Let it be permitted to designate by this expression the belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be expelled from science! Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary to get rid of ‘the soul’ thereby, and thus renounce one of the oldest and most venerated hypotheses—as happens frequently to the clumsiness of naturalists, who can hardly touch on the soul without immediately losing it. But the way is open for new acceptations and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as ‘mortal soul,’ and ‘soul of subjective multiplicity,’ and ‘soul as social structure of the instincts and passions,’ want henceforth to have legitimate rights in science. In that the NEW psychologist is about to put an end to the superstitions which have hitherto flourished with almost tropical luxuriance around the idea of the soul, he is really, as it were, thrusting himself into a new desert and a new distrust—it is possible that the older psychologists had a merrier and more comfortable time of it; eventually, however, he finds that precisely thereby he is also condemned to INVENT—and, who knows? perhaps to DISCOVER the new. 13. Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to DISCHARGE its strength—life itself is WILL TO POWER; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent RESULTS thereof. In short, here, as everywhere else, Free eBooks at Planet eBook. com 1 let us beware of SUPERFLUOUS teleological principles! — one of which is the instinct of self- preservation (we owe it to Spinoza’s inconsistency). It is thus, in effect, that method ordains, which must be essentially economy of principles. 14. It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that natural philosophy is only a world-exposition and worldarrangement (according to us, if I may say so! ) and NOT a world-explanation; but in so far as it is based on belief in the senses, it is regarded as more, and for a long time to come must be regarded as more—namely, as an explanation. It has eyes and fingers of its own, it has ocular evidence and palpableness of its own: this operates fascinatingly, persuasively, and CONVINCINGLY upon an age with fundamentally plebeian tastes—in fact, it follows instinctively the canon of truth of eternal popular sensualism. What is clear, what is ‘explained’? Only that which can be seen and felt—one must pursue every problem thus far. Obversely, however, the charm of the Platonic mode of thought, which was an ARISTOCRATIC mode, consisted precisely in RESISTANCE to obvious sense-evidence—perhaps among men who enjoyed even stronger and more fastidious senses than our contemporaries, but who knew how to find a higher triumph in remaining masters of them: and this by means of pale, cold, grey conceptional networks which they threw over the motley whirl of the senses—the mob of the senses, as Plato said. In this overcoming of the world, and interpreting of the world in the manner of Plato, there was an ENJOYMENT different from that which the physicists 0 Beyond Good and Evil of today offer us—and likewise the Darwinists and antiteleologists among the physiological workers, with their principle of the ‘smallest possible effort,’ and the greatest possible blunder. ‘Where there is nothing more to see or to grasp, there is also nothing more for men to do’—that is certainly an imperative different from the Platonic one, but it may notwithstanding be the right imperative for a hardy, laborious race of machinists and bridge- builders of the future, who have nothing but ROUGH work to perform. 15. To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist on the fact that the sense-organs are not phenomena in the sense of the idealistic philosophy; as such they certainly could not be causes! Sensualism, therefore, at least as regulative hypothesis, if not as heuristic principle. What? And others say even that the external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as a part of this external world, would be the work of our organs! But then our organs themselves would be the work of our organs! It seems to me that this is a complete REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM, if the conception CAUSA SUI is something fundamentally absurd. Consequently, the external world is NOT the work of our organs—? 16. There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are ‘immediate certainties†; for instance, ‘I think,’ or as the superstition of Schopenhauer puts it, ‘I will†; as though cognition here got hold of its object purely and simply as ‘the thing in itself,’ without any falsification taking place eiFree eBooks at Planet eBook. com 1 ther on the part of the subject or the object. I would repeat it, however, a hundred times, that ‘immediate certainty,’ as well as ‘absolute knowledge’ and the ‘thing in itself,’ involve a CONTRADICTIO IN ADJECTO; we really ought to free ourselves from the misleading significance of words! The people on their part may think that cognition is knowing all about things, but the philosopher must say to himself: ‘When I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence, ‘I think,’ I find a whole series of daring assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an ‘ego,’ and finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking—that I KNOW what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps ‘willing’ or ‘feeling’?

The Impact of Globalization on the Economy

The impact of globalization on the economy Globalization is one of the main features of modern society. Today it covers almost all spheres of human activity, and its influence becomes more and more obvious. To talk about the effects of globalization, it is necessary to understand its nature and the factors, sources, which led to its emergence. Today majority of scientists agree that economic globalization â€Å"is the increasing economic interdependence of national economies across the world through a rapid increase in cross-border movement of goods, service, technology, and capital†.There are several sources of globalization. The first factor is technological advances. E-mail, the Internet, and the World Wide Web have significantly lowered the costs of transportation and communication in international trade and in doing business by and large. Next reason of globalization is trade liberalization that has led to more liberal world trading system. And finally source of globaliza tion is creating globalized media, the arts, and popular culture with the widespread use of the English language for global communication.Of course there is not a complete list of the factors of globalization, but in my opinion, those mentioned sources are the most important. Globalization has significant impacts on all economies of the world, with various effects. There are heated debates around positive and negative effects of globalization. Leading pro-globalization arguments make a strong case that globalization is simply the industrial revolution that rationalizes economic activity everywhere. For instance, it affects countries’ production of goods and services.It also affects investment, both in physical capital and in human capital. It also has major effects on efficiency, productivity and competitiveness. On the other hand, scientists consider about so-called paradox of globalization: in many cases, the gap between the rich and the poor is increasingly widening. An ar rival of foreign companies and foreign capital creates a reduction of unemployment and poverty; however it can also increase the wage gap between well-educated, skilled workers and those who are not. In the short term, some of the poor will become poorer.The arrival of foreign companies into developing countries increases employment in many sectors. But those foreign companies arrive with the new technology, which extends across the country. Automation, especially in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors reduces the need for unskilled laborers. As a result, employment rate in these sectors falls. To sum up, globalization is a complex process that works in various ways and has different effects. In my opinion, some solutions are needed to reduce negative impacts of globalization and to find happy medium between developed and developing countries.